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PARLIAMENT 
Progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market 
A. CONTEXT  
The relevance of energy to Europe's growth and competitiveness is steadily increasing. 
Reliable energy services at acceptable prices for both industrial and household users continue 
to be a key factor in social and economic development. A well-functioning internal energy 
market is essential if all three of Europe’s energy challenges of competitiveness, sustainability 
and security of supply are to be met. 
The last step on the road to competitive energy markets was achieved on 1 July 2007 with the 
full opening of national retail markets. From a legal perspective, all European consumers are 
now able to choose their supplier and benefit from competition.  
However, this report shows that, in practice, market integration is still far from a success. 
With very few exceptions, electricity and gas markets in the EU remain national in economic 
scope with limited competition. 
This report highlights that the problems identified in the Commission’s 2006/07 Progress 
Report and Sectoral Inquiry Report on the European electricity and gas markets to a large 
extent still remain. Not all the shortcomings can be solved within existing legislation: 
improved legislative measures are needed. 
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN KEY AREAS, REMAINING DEFICIENCIES  
1. Implementation of legislation 
All Member States1 have met the deadline of 1 July 2007 for full opening of their gas and 
electricity markets.2 Restrictions to free and fair competition have, however, developed 
through the coexistence of open market segments and end-user supply price regulation. 
More than three years after the deadline of July 2004 for implementation, some Member 
States have still not properly implemented the legal requirements of the Electricity and Gas 
Directives.3 This concerns in particular core areas of market liberalisation, such as regulatory 
oversight, unbundling and regulated supply tariffs as well as the communication of Public 
Service Obligations.  
Regulators have a key statutory role in monitoring compliance of network operators. ERGEG4 
plays an important role in coordinating national monitoring and thus harmonising compliance 
                                                 
1 Insofar as not benefiting from derogation. 
2 Technical Annex (TA), section 1. 
3 TA, section1. 
4 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas set up by Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 
November 2003. 
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review. ERGEG's monitoring5 in 2007 of implementation of the Electricity6 and Gas7 
Regulation shows inadequate compliance in areas of core relevance for the development of 
liquid markets such as transparency and primary capacity allocation. Some 15% of European 
gas TSOs do not comply with the gas transparency requirements. Historical flows, utilisation 
rates and the legally required forecast of available capacities are not published by about a 
third of TSOs. At the same time, a third of TSOs making use of the “3 minus shipper rule”8 do 
not publish the aggregated data required and nearly 85% of TSOs apply the exemption rule 
without the requisite regulatory approval. 
Reporting on market indicators — a Member State responsibility — is generally insufficient. 
For example, only 30% of national regulators can indicate the switching rates for the groups 
of industry, small and medium businesses and households.  
2. Market integration  
Market integration has still not developed to a sufficient extent. This is demonstrated by price 
differences, regional monopolies and persistent cross-border congestion between Member 
States, for example. 
In a well-integrated market, competition will keep prices similar among adjacent Member 
States or regions. Energy prices for industrial electricity customers in the EU are starting to 
converge in the Central and North Western EU areas but still differ by almost 100% in some 
cases.9 More efficient use of infrastructure has led to some improvement in electricity price 
correlation, particularly between the region of the 
Netherlands/Belgium/Austria/France/Germany and the Nordic market.  
Cross-border trade is a key source of competitive pressure on prices. Sufficient network 
capacities being a prerequisite for such trade, the persistent bottlenecks in gas and electricity 
infrastructure need to be removed. In five Member States, the electricity interconnection 
capacity in relation to installed capacity is below 10%. In a further ten Member States, it is 
between 10 and 30%. Coordinated planning of investment and testing of market demand are 
fundamental to capacity provision from a European perspective. Voluntary steps taken within 
the Regional Initiative promoted by the Commission with the operational support of 
ERGEG10 (e.g. coordinated demand surveys for gas flows on the Iberian Peninsula, regional 
transport and storage investment analysis in the South East Gas Region) are certainly positive. 
But voluntary arrangements cannot sufficiently guarantee the necessary level of security to 
cover market demand.  
Lack of independence of network operators continues to be a barrier to adequate investment. 
Experience shows that in cases where national incumbents are shareholders in transport 
networks on their markets, their interest in limiting competition in their national market is 
often a barrier to sufficient capacity expansion upstream. The correlation between proper 
unbundling and investment is demonstrated by analyses. The share of congestion revenue 
                                                 
5 Available at www.ergeg.org. 
6 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. 
7 Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 
8 Rule allowing TSOs a restricted level of publication where fewer than 3 shippers are active at the 
relevant network point; see Article 6(3) Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 
9 TA, section 5. 
10 www.ergeg.org. 
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reinvested in interconnection capacity has been about twice as high for ownership unbundled 
TSOs as for vertically integrated TSOs and investment levels in the three to four years since 
ownership unbundling have at least doubled.  
It has to be recognised, however, that other factors influence investment levels, particularly 
tariff regulation. Regulators should provide an investment friendly framework, involving a 
stable regulatory system and fair incentives for investment and an integrated market, 
including, but not only, aiming for tariff reduction. Incentive regulation has not yet developed 
sufficiently. 
Legal differences between Member States remain a barrier to market integration. For 
example, a coordinated gas capacity auction pilot scheme in the North West Gas Region11 was 
blocked by differences in national legislation. More support from Member States is needed to 
overcome these obstacles. 
The full benefits of sufficient infrastructure will not be felt unless the capacity is made 
available to market participants on a non-discriminatory basis that favours trading. 
Differentiated treatment of cross-border services and domestic transmission has to be seen as 
critical to non-discrimination among users and compatibility with existing (and proposed) 
legislation. At the same time, capacity systems need to move towards the utmost possible 
flexibility, which is best offered in a decoupled entry-exit system. 
Regional developments 
Bilateral and multilateral projects for improving cross-border integration have been set up, 
such as the Regional Initiatives driven by ERGEG, government cooperation within the 
Pentalateral Forums in North West Europe and MIBEL/MIGAS for the Iberian countries. 
Unlike other initiatives, the Energy Community boosts regional cooperation on a legally 
binding basis.  
These projects play a useful role in the development of best practice solutions. For example, 
the Regional Initiatives driven by ERGEG have worked on coordinated capacity allocation 
across borders in North West European gas markets, coordinated demand analysis and 
investment planning in the Iberian and South East European12 gas markets, regulatory 
coordination towards harmonised regulatory decision-making across borders and improved 
transparency. In 2006, the trilateral electricity market coupling project — a capacity 
allocation mechanism which guarantees energy flows in the right direction in relation to spot 
prices — became operational between France, Belgium and the Netherlands and dramatically 
increased the efficiency of dispatch of power production in the region. The Pentalateral 
Forum for electricity succeeded in agreeing on a common flow-based cross-border capacity 
allocation mechanism for the whole region. Work on gas started recently and is expected to 
focus on legal bottlenecks and security of supply. In November 2007, the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland started creating a common wholesale electricity market. Progress is 
planned on a gas market. 
The regional approach allows different levels of market development to be taken into account, 
with the common goal of realising the single market. 
                                                 
11 UK, NL, B, F, IRL, DE, DK, SW, N-IRL, Norway (observer). 
12 AT, CZ, GR, H, IT, PL, SK, SI. 
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3. Concentration and consolidation  
Market structures on a national scale are still very concentrated. In addition, incumbents 
control essential infrastructure facilities, further increasing their market power.  
Between 2005 and mid-2007, the number of independent suppliers on the electricity market 
increased in 40% of the Member States where data was available. In gas, the number 
increased only in a quarter of the Member States. However, in France, Italy, Poland and the 
Netherlands, the increase was 50% or more (10 to 15 suppliers in France; 0 to 75 in Poland; 8 
to 20 in the Netherlands; 123 to 182 (2006) in Italy). In 7 out of 21 Member States, no 
independent supplier is active on the national gas market. In electricity this is reported only 
for Cyprus, but relevant data for electricity is not available for 15 Member States. 
Retail markets are not yet well developed, mainly because of limited access to gas supplies 
for new entrants. Even in the most developed market — the UK — competitive forces are 
dominated by gas producers. Entry of new producers to the supply portfolio remains crucial 
for both competition and security of supply. LNG plays an important role.  
Alongside highly concentrated national markets, the tendency towards consolidation and 
concentration continues. As long as the players emerging from mergers and acquisitions act 
on a real competitive basis, this does not necessarily have negative effects on competition. 
Governments, national regulators and competition authorities should actively create a 
framework that forces competitive behaviour where it is not expected to develop from market 
structures, e.g. via capacity release, gas release programmes and strict transparency 
requirements.  
4. Price trends  
Customers in the EU-15 Member States benefited from cumulative price savings from 
electricity liberalisation of the order of €60 billion in the period 1998 to 2004. These savings 
were partly countered by price increases in later periods. EU-27 gas prices have risen along 
with oil price developments. Prices rose for industrial users by an average of 35% between 
2005 and 2006 and a further 12% in 2007. The total increase from 2005 to 2007 was 
comparable for household customers, although major price increases came into effect mainly 
in 2007.13 
There are several reasons for these developments. As competition is still limited, competitive 
pressures on prices are correspondingly weak. Moreover, prices mirror general trends, notably 
in oil prices, which increased by more than 50% between 2005 and 2007. Given the linkage of 
gas prices to oil prices and the increasing significance of gas in power production, oil price 
developments affect the prices of both gas and electricity. 
At the same time, there are indications that the independence of network operators is having a 
favourable influence on prices, through its promotion of network efficiency, facilitation of 
network access for third parties and contribution to market confidence. Since market opening 
in 1998, Member States with ownership unbundled TSOs have experienced more positive 
price developments than Member States where the TSOs were and are still related to supply 
companies. 
                                                 
13 Eurostat, data as of 1 January each year. 
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5. Independence of network operators  
Functional unbundling is still not effectively implemented in all Member States.14 This 
applies both to electricity and gas and to transmission and distribution system operators. Some 
Member States have gone beyond present unbundling requirements. In electricity, about half 
of the Member States have ownership unbundled network operators; in gas, seven Member 
States do.15 
At distribution level, Member States are making extensive use of derogations: half of the 
Member States allow DSOs with less than 100 000 customers to be exempted from legal 
unbundling requirements, both for electricity and for gas.16 
Insufficient independence of network operators is reflected in underinvestment in network 
capacities and in particular in inadequate cross-border capacities. Legal unbundling has not 
been sufficient to cope with this effect. 
6. Effective regulation by regulators 
Despite the Electricity and Gas Directives requiring regulators to hold a minimum set of 
powers, the unequal levels of regulatory powers across borders have not improved. In some 
Member States, powers are split between several regulators at national and regional levels, 
including the competition authority and/or ministry. This is all likely to add to incoherence. 
Regulatory oversight of wholesale and retail markets hardly exists in any Member State. 
Non-compliance with European legislation is often met by insufficient or ineffective penalties 
in national legislation. At the same time, ERGEG monitoring reports on the implementation 
of existing legislation make it clear that regulators are not sufficiently committed to making 
use of existing powers to actively encourage implementation of legal requirements. An 
ERGEG report to the 14th Madrid Forum, for example, demonstrated only one case of a 
regulatory authority making use of its power to impose sanctions on a TSO not complying 
with legal requirements.  
The scope of market integration requires harmonisation of regulatory decisions across 
borders. ERGEG and the European Regulatory Forums for electricity and gas (“Florence 
Forum”/“Madrid Forum”) certainly contribute to this process by providing discussion 
platforms to tackle problems on a practical level and developing commonly agreed best 
practice solutions. However, the “regulatory gap” remains a barrier to coordinated decision 
making across borders, which cannot be solved by the existing model of voluntary 
cooperation by ERGEG.  
                                                 
14 Within ERGEG public consultation on functional unbundling guidelines, TSOs, for example, raised the 
need for network managers to be involved in the management of integrated companies, and even for 
those managers to be given incentives linked to the success of the integrated company as a whole. See 
comments published at www.ergeg.org – Public Consultations – Energy – GGP Functional Unbundling. 
15 TA, section 7. 
16 TA, section 7. 
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7. Customer dimension 
Consumer response — switching  
Electricity switching is at a high level in Iberian countries, the Czech Republic and Nordic 
countries and above average for especially large industrial customers in Germany, Austria and 
Luxembourg. In most other countries, the annual switching rate for households is about 1% or 
below. The picture is similar for gas, except that Italy is one of the +1% performers. While the 
rates of switching for larger customers continue to rise, most small business customers and 
households still have limited scope to exercise their right to choose.  
Switching rates are not the only indicator of functioning competition in retail markets. Often 
competing offers are unavailable or are too similar to amount to a real choice. Member States 
and national regulators must ensure that transparent and simple switching procedures exist, to 
give customers the confidence they need. Moreover, retail competition is distorted by 
regulated supply tariffs. 
Service quality 
Market liberalisation typically aims to improve the position of consumers. The possibility of 
supplier choice and consequent competitive pressure results in a better match of service 
supply and user demand. The Gas and Electricity Directives put clear emphasis on consumer 
rights. Market surveys have concluded that the level of satisfaction with the quality of 
electricity and gas services provided is generally good.17 Concerns that the introduction of 
competition would lead to a decline in service standards or problems in the provision of 
universal service have proved unfounded. 
Benefiting from liberalisation requires access to energy supply. Analyses18 show that a very 
large majority of European end-users have easy access to electricity and gas — the EU-27 
average rising to 93% for the non-substitutable electricity sector and 72% for gas, where 
substitutes are often available. On average, two thirds (66%) of EU citizens deem the cost of 
electricity services to be affordable; for gas the figure is similar. Neither sector has shown 
significant variations by socio-demographic category or between results for EU-15 and EU-
27.19 
Regulated prices 
Coexistence of open energy markets and regulated energy prices is quite common among EU 
Member States: it exists in one third of the gas markets for at least one market segment and 
more than half of the electricity markets. For most Members States with price regulation, 
regulation is not limited to small customers — all customer segments can be supplied at 
regulated prices.20 
The negative effects of regulated energy prices remain a major concern. They lead 
immediately to a distortion of competition and reduce liquidity in wholesale markets. In the 
                                                 
17 EUROBAROMETER, Prices and quality of services of general interest, September 2005; and 2007 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/consumer_service_finrep_en.pdf. 
18 EUROBAROMETER, Services of General Interest – chapter 1.4-1.5, July 2007. 
19 EUROBAROMETER, Services of General Interest – chapter 3.1, July 2007. 
20 ERGEG, Status review on end-user price regulation, 14.6.2007 (Ref: E07-CPR-08-04), ww.ergeg.org. 
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long run, regulated prices give wrong price signals to investors and thus have a negative 
impact on the development of new infrastructure. By setting a price level that does not allow 
new entrants to supply at cost-covering prices, price regulation creates a market entry barrier 
for alternative suppliers and thus directly threatens security of supply. For the French market, 
for example, the power exchange has indicated its inability to set a market reference price 
given regulated energy prices. Measures for consumer protection should not be mixed with 
competitive instruments, they should be addressed by separate means. 
C. SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
European summer and winter electricity outlook reports drawn up in 2007 by the Group of 
European Electricity Transmission System Operators (ETSO) and European Gas 
Transmission System Operators (Gas Infrastructure Europe, GIE) suggest that no particular 
risk of power shortage is expected in the medium term. These reports summarise national and 
regional power balance forecasts, balancing generation and peak demand. The reports assess 
the global adequacy of interconnected systems. However, under severe conditions such as low 
or very high temperatures or gas-supply crises, the power systems become more stressed, 
especially if that same period is also critical for neighbouring countries. 
Provision of sufficient transport capacities continues to be a pivotal point not only for the 
development of competition but also for security of supply. In terms of gas supply in 
particular, the European Union relies increasingly on imports.21 With indigenous gas reserves 
declining and gas consumption worldwide expected to increase significantly, diversification 
of routes or sources plays a key role in reducing dependence on today’s three major pipeline 
sources, Russia, Norway and Algeria. With growing gas prices, the role of LNG in 
diversification is steadily increasing.  
Electricity and gas networks are at the heart of a well-functioning European market. Obstacles 
still remain to the completion of the priority projects that have already been identified. 
Coordinators have been designated for the projects declared to be of European interest and 
encountering delays or implementation difficulties. These projects are: (1) Power link 
between Germany, Poland and Lithuania; (2) Connections to offshore wind power in Northern 
Europe; (3) Interconnection between France and Spain; and (4) Nabucco gas pipeline. 
For electricity, dependence on imports is lower. Generation can be based on indigenous 
sources, including renewables, and on fuels for which a diversified world market exists (e.g. 
coal). However, the dependence of power generation on gas, much of which is imported, is 
increasing. Alongside this, investors in infrastructure are facing new challenges. The 
electricity system is becoming reliant on gas infrastructure. Investment in renewable 
electricity production (such as wind) requires high capacity transport infrastructure to adapt 
the system to unbalanced capacity use. 
After the cold winter of 2005/2006, some countries undertook to build up gas storage and to 
maximise the use of import capacity. Italy, for instance, introduced ship or pay contracts 
under which shippers could opt out of transportation capacities in order to increase physical 
use of capacities. At the end of 2006 through to 2007, a small gas surplus emerged which 
allowed an increase in gas trade, bringing some liquidity to hubs. It remains to be seen 
whether this will become the basis for a positive and dynamic future market developments.  
                                                 
21 TA, section 8. 
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The EU will not only need to continue to focus on the strategic dimension of its energy 
relations with third countries, particularly suppliers, it will also have to keep in mind the 
importance of providing a market structure that enables suppliers and investors to benefit 
from an open market and a barrier-free flow of energy. This calls for action by the 
Commission, governments and regulators as much as by network operators. A critical factor is 
delays in authorisation procedures for investments. These now constitute a major risk to 
security of supply and the development of the internal market. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite some encouraging improvements, notably on cross-border coordination at regional 
level, the overall analysis of progress on the internal market in electricity and natural gas 
shows that major barriers to the efficient functioning of the market still exist. 
Insufficient implementation of European legislation remains a crucial factor. Improvement 
has to be driven by the Commission, Member States, regulators and industry together: 
• In parallel, national regulators must be empowered with a view to ensuring proper 
implementation of legislation by stakeholders.  
• Regulators themselves have to act on their own responsibility to encourage implementation 
of legal requirements. Harmonisation of regulatory best practice models across borders is 
certainly needed if practical barriers to cross-border trade are to be reduced. The Regional 
Initiatives driven by ERGEG and other similar projects at government level are positive 
contributions to this process.  
• The industry must observe the legal requirements without compromise. Implementation of 
European legislation does not allow for negotiations. 
• Regulated energy prices remain a major concern.  
The major concerns in the various areas all share two characteristics: significant impact 
hampering the development of a well-functioning internal market in electricity and gas, which 
cannot be solved within the existing legal framework. The Commission has therefore 
addressed these shortcomings in a legislative package, which it presented on 19 September 
2007. 
